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Introduction

Bradley W. Bateman and John B. Davis
It is not clear what draws so many scholars to the work of 1.M. Keynes.
There are certainly several possibilities: his central role in the development
of modern macroeconomics; the widespread belief that he 'saved capitalism' with his advocacy of deficit spending during the Great Depression; his part at the Versailles Peace Conference and fame as the author
of The Economic Consequences ofthe Peace; his activity at Bretton Woods
in the founding of the post-war monetary system; his involvement in the
avant-garde Bloomsbury group. But, whatever the reasons, there seelTl8
to be no decline in interest in Keynes 's lifetime of work, as each year the
number of essays and books published on Keynes continues to increase.
Indeed, in the 1980s, interest in Keynes's work began to spread beyond
the writings and discuss' ,~ n s of economists, as historians (Clarke,
Skidelsky, Peden) and political scientists (Hall, Skocpol, Hadley,
Gourevitch) added their contributions to the growing literature on Keynes.
Another new area of interest has been the philosophical dimensions of
Keynes's early thinking and its relationship to his later work in economics.
Ironically, although most standard treatments of the history ofprobabiJity
theory include a discussion of Keynes's Treatise on Probability, until
recently the existence of the Treatise and Keynes's early career as a
philosopher have gone largely unnoticed by economists. Indeed, for
many years it had been standard practice to explain The General Theory
as the end-product of an evolution that began with A Tract on Monetary
Reform and A Treatise on Money , while ignoring Keynes's earlier intellectual development in his first years at Cambridge; this despite the fact
that it is in the Treatise on Probability that Keynes first develops ideas
which were arguably laterto underlie his thinking about expectations and
uncertainty - an area of considerable importance in The General Theory .
It is fair to say that much of the new interest in Keynes's early thinking
can be traced to a widespread preoccupation with expectations in modern
macroeconomics in the 1970s and 1980s, and the recent recognition that
Keynes's own thinking about expectations dated from his early philo-
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sophical investigation of probability and induction in the Treatise on
Probability. Thus, although Keynesian economic theory was, for a time,
popularly considered obsolete on account of its supposed neglect of
expectations, economists have increasingly come to recognize that
Keynes's thinking in this regard was both extensive and well motivated
by carefully considered philosophical positions in probability theory.
This has drawn attention to the entire trajectory of Keynes ' s intel1ectual
career and has demonstrated to many the central role of philosophical
assumptions in economics.
It is important to note, however, that the Treatise on Probability does
not mark the beginning of Keynes's work in philosophy; it is the
culmination of over 15 years' work. Initial convictions for thinkers of
great insight and synthetic understanding are often important to their
later intel1ectual development, and Keynes himself testified in his 1938
'My Early Beliefs' memoir to the importance of the earliest Cambridge
influences on the development of his later thinking. These influences
concerned, of course, the considerable impression which the wel1-known
Cambridge philosopherG.E. Moore 's Principia Ethica had upon Keynes
and other members of the Cambridge Conversazione Society, or Apostles. Keynes in fact wrote a number of yet unpublished philsophical
papers on topics in Moore's Principia, a number of which (in particular,
his 1904 ' Ethics in Relation to Conduct' ) have recently been argued by
scholars to have contributed to Keynes's first ideas for his Treatise on
Probability, as well as to his later economic thinking. The interest in
Keynes as a philosopher, then, is still quite fresh, and attention to
Keynes' s early intellectual career promises to form an important part of
future scholarship on Keynes.
The essays in this collection represent an introduction to the work of
a number of the people currently concerned with the philosophical
foundations of Keynes' s thought. Each of the essays is an original
contribution that reflects the author's perspective on interpreting Keynes's
philosophy.
The first essay, by Yuichi Shionoya, examines the relationship between
Keynes's much-quoted 'My Early Beliefs' memoir and his philosophical
beginnings at Cambridge in Moore's circle. Shionoya argues that Keynes
adopted Moore's meta-ethical intuitionism and agreed that hedonism
was an inadequate conception of the good, whilst rejecting Moore's
consequentialist teleology and emphasis on rules in determining right
behaviour. This interpretation of Keynes 's early positions is distinguished
from that associated with R.B . Braithwaite's influential reading of
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Keynes's philosophical views and thus serves an important function in
setting forth the issues first addressed by those concerned to connect the
different stages of Keynes's intellectual career. Shionoya also discusses
the relationship between Keynes's ethics and politics.
Indeed, some of the most vexing questio'ls about Keynes's thinking
concern his political philosophy. What spirit and ideology infonned his
lifelong professional interest in economic management? Suzanne Helburn
finds the answer in Keynes's early interest in the work and life of Edmund
Burke. Because Burke is noted for his conservative thought, this association may seem paradoxical at first, but Helbum's careful exegesis is
successful in illuminating the similarities and differences between the
two thinkers. She argues that the dimensions of Keynes's utilitarian
analysis, ethics and elitism all stem from his understanding of this
eighteenth-century political philosopher.
Bradley Bateman 's essay on the analytical foundations of Keynes's
policy proposals is an attempt to break with much of the emerging
literature on Keynes's philosophical background. Unlike those who
argue that Keynes developed one philosophical position in his youth
which infonns all his later thinking, Bateman uses Keynes's statements
during the 1930s that his beliefs had changed to tell a much different
story . On this telling, it was Keynes's shift from a belief in objective
value and objective probabilities to a belief in subjective value and
subjective probabilities that provided him with the tools necessary for
modelling expectations and making satisfactory policy recommendations.
Understanding this perspective also involves a break with the naive view
that The General Theory is a book meant to advocate fiscal fine-tuning.
Rod O' Donnell 's essay on the weight of argument in Keynes's
theoretical work is an effort to clarify some of the confusion surrounding
an often misunderstood idea. O' Donnell traces the origins of the concept
of weight in Keynes ' s early work, and discusses its role in the Treatise
on Probability and The General Theory. He argues that weight is not
identical to evidence but, rather, that it represents the credence which a
given amount of evidence provides for a probability; although credence
always increases with the amount of evidence, the two notions are not
identical. 0 ' Donnell concludes by arguing that Keynes's lifelong interest
in the improved collection and dissemination of economic data was
partly motivated by his concern with weight.
In his essay, John Davis turns to Keynes 's 1938 characterization of
economics as a moral science and investigates how this view was rooted
in Keynes's early philosophical convictions. Davis argues that Keynes
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stressed the importance of introspection and judgements of value for
understanding economic agents' responses to the uncertainties of action,
and did so with the intention of contrasting his view of economics to that
of Lionel Robbins. For Keynes, introspection and judgements of value
are made possible by individuals' capacity for both individual judgement
and for judging what is intersubjectively objective. Robbins's rejection
of interpersonal utility comparisons stemmed from a failure to recognize
that latter dimension to human judgement; Keynes's attention to this
dimension, it is suggested, underlies his v iew of the independent variables
of The General Theory.
In her essay, Anna Carabelli also turns to Keynes's methodological
thinking by examining the underlying principles of Keynes's critique of
what he termed 'classical theory'. She argues that Keynes recognized the
ineffectiveness of past critiques of orthodox theory, and that a successful
critique demanded new epistemolegical thinking. Indeed, the fault of
classical theory lay neither in its empirical unacceptability nor in logical
inconsistency but rather in certain of its tacit assumptions concerning
'logical independence' which effectively defined its domain of validity
in universal terms. Keynes, however, rejected these assumptions, and in
tum developed an understanding of an organic interrelation among the
key variables of a 'complex' economic system. Carabelli concludes that
Keynes's methodological views are central to his elaboration of an
alternative economic theory.
Another area of interest in Keynes's philosophical work is his early
idealism - a concept which can, of course, be interpreted in a number of
ways. Athol Fitzgibbons's essay is an attempt to argue that Keynes's
early idealism is a form of Platonism inherited from Moore's work, and
that this Platonism had an important role in the development of Keynes's
early ~litist views. Moreover, because it can be argued Keynes remained
an ~litist throughout his life, Fitzgibbons suggests that the influence of
Keynes's early beliefs retained a place in Keynes's later thinking about
economic life.
The range of interpretations in these papers should provide a valuable
introduction to the philosophical foundations of Keynes's economics.
Keynes, like Adam Smith, Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill, was actually
a philosopher--economist and must be understood as such. But it is not
just an exegetical, scholarly gain to understand these foundations; coming
to understand them also facilitates a better understanding of the types of
influences which have been responsible for some of the greatest advances
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in economics. Thus. in addition to providing a better understanding of the
history of economic thought. these essays provide a basis for an introduction to the type of know ledge that produces successful theories.

